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Abstract 
 
Background: Cream skimming can be defined as the selective treatment of patients 
that demand little resources while providing high economic refunds. We test whether 
cream skimming occurs after the introduction of DRG-based activity-based financing 
(ABF) in Norway in 1997 and if the problem further increases after the 2002 
organizational reform where hospitals were turned into trusts. The DRG-system offers 
the same economic reimbursement for patients classified within day-surgical DRGs 
irrespective of whether the patient receives same-day treatment or in-patient care over 
several days. This both gives a potential for cream skimming and allow us to 
investigate cream skimming within the actual diagnoses. Method: Patient data from 
the period 1999-2005 is analyzed. Waiting time, as an indicator of patient selection, is 
analyzed as a function of severity within each diagnosis, controlling for age and 
gender of the patient, as well as institutional and time-dependent variables. Results: 
The analysis gives some evidence of cream skimming in the period of ABF, in 
particular within the lighter orthopaedic diagnosis. However, cream skimming does 
not increase after the 2002 organizational reform but is stable, or for some DRGs even 
reduced. Conclusion: The study indicates that cream skimming may occur if the 
reimbursement system is not particularly sophisticated, but also that political 
signalling can reduce the problem. 
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1. Introduction 
Cream skimming can be defined as the selective treatment of patients that demand 
little resources while providing high economic refunds. An assumption for cream 
skimming to occur is that health insurers or health providers are able to distinguish 
subgroups of individuals with different expected costs within a risk group for which 
the risk-adjusted payment is identical (de Ven & van Vliet, 1992). Cream skimming 
may take on different forms, such as insurers avoiding high-risk individuals or 
hospitals choosing low risk patients from their waiting lists, and is usually assumed to 
prove a more significant problem in market-oriented than in non-market oriented 
systems (Le Grand, 1991). Given that recent health reforms in many Western 
countries have led to introduction of market-oriented hospital financing schemes (e.g. 
Newhouse, 1994), there is consequently a growing interest in exploring the potential 
for protection against cream skimming, while at the same time preserving incentives 
to efficiency. Adapting to the increasing market-orientation in Western welfare 
systems, Norway put into operation an activity-based financing (ABF) scheme for the 
hospitals from 1 July 1997 (Biørn et al, 2003). A second major reform was 
implemented in 2002 as the central government took over responsibility and 
ownership of all public hospitals from the counties, and turned them into trusts 
(Hagen & Kaarbøe, 2006).  
The study of cream-skimming is mainly rooted in the economic literature, and 
builds on a theoretical rather than an empirical approach, with the main ambition 
being the development of financing systems that reduces the scope for such behaviour 
(e.g. Matsaganis & Glennerster, 1993; Jones & Cullis, 1996; Ellis, 1999; Barros, 
2003). The approach of the present paper is somewhat different, as our ambition is to 
explore the actual patient prioritisation of Norwegian hospitals in the wake of the 
1997 reform of the financing system and the 2002 hospital reform. We concentrate on 
day surgery. Day surgery has gained increasing significance during the last decade. 
Norwegian public health policy objectives explicitly state an aim to move towards 
outpatient and same-day surgical services, and this mode of treatment now constitutes 
more than 60 per cent of all elective surgery (Martinussen, 2005). The main 
arguments for substituting inpatient care with day surgery are well known: it is 
assumed to be less traumatising for the patient, involves lighter narcosis than in the 
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case of traditional surgery, and implies shorter treatment time and faster 
convalescence. The underlying assumption is therefore that this mode of delivering 
surgery will ultimately increase the efficiency of hospitals as well as the quality of the 
patient treatment. Whereas studies of day surgery have addressed aspects such as 
patient satisfaction (Roberts et al., 1995; Kangas-Saarela et al., 1998; Mitchell, 1999; 
Lau et al., 2000), clinical outcomes (Pineault et al., 1985), cost efficiency (Russel et 
al., 1977; Pineault et al., 1985; Ancona-Berk & Chalmers, 1986; Keithley et al., 1989; 
Heath et al., 1990; Hollmann et al., 1994; Janeke, 1994; Clarke, 1996; Weale, 2002; 
Martinussen & Midttun, 2004), and waiting time (Midttun & Martinussen, 2005), 
little attention has been paid to the actual patient priorities within these kind of 
procedures.  
Using patient data from 1999-2005, the main focus of our study is on the 
relationship between patient severity and waiting time for day surgery within the 
actual diagnosis related groups (DRGs). Do hospitals give priority to patients that can 
be treated and discharged at the same day over patients that need in-patient care over 
several days? Simply put, if a hospital can choose between patients that provide the 
same economic reimbursement, is it then more likely that low severity patients will be 
chosen for treatment before high severity patients? Given that length of stay (LOS) 
can be considered a proxy on the severity of the patient’s medical condition and 
thereby on the resource use associated with the hospital stay, the central question to 
be addressed is whether the waiting time for treatment within the same day-surgical 
DRGs is shorter for patients with short length of stays than for patients with long 
length of stays.  
The day-surgical DRGs are of particular interest in our setting, since the ABF 
system offers the same economic reimbursement for patients classified within day-
surgical DRGs irrespective of whether the patient is actually treated the same day or 
as in-patients. The potential for cream skimming should consequently be especially 
high within these DRGs, since the hospitals will have an economic incentive for 
prioritising patients that imply the shortest length of stay. Naturally, the waiting time 
for treatment is dependent upon other factors than patient severity alone, and our 
empirical analysis controls for the age and gender of the patient, the year of treatment 
as well as hospital-specific effects.   
The paper is organised as follows. The next section gives a brief introduction to 
the theoretical concept in question; the problem of patient selection. Section 3 
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discusses the operationalization of our main variables and describes the development 
of day surgery in Norwegian health care. In section 4 we develop the empirical model. 
The empirical results are reported in section 6, while section 7 contains the 
concluding remarks. 
2. The problem of patient selection 
Selection problems like cream skimming is usually related to health care systems 
where competing insurers receive a risk-adjusted premium per insured patient or 
providers receive risk-adjusted payments for treated patients. The essence of the 
problem on the provider side, as Newhouse (1989) puts it, is that a physician treating 
a patient will have more information about the patient's likely future spending than 
any risk-adjustment formula can incorporate. In such a context cream skimming can 
be viewed as a form of preferred risk-selection, as the insurer or provider select 
patients with expected payments to be above the expected cost level. In a theoretical 
investigation of the implications of different payment incentives, Ellis (1999) 
compares cost-based reimbursement, prospective payment, and a mixed payment 
system. His conclusion that prospective payment may result in undesirable creaming, 
skimping, and dumping is not merely a theoretical possibility; it is also one that has 
been found empirically to occur: real world examples of such behaviour includes 
Newhouse and Byrne (1988), Newhouse (1989) and Frank and Lave (1989).  
The two major reforms in Norwegian secondary care during the last 10 years, 
the introduction of activity based financing (ABF) in 1997 and the hospital reform of 
2002, may both have affected the way patients are prioritized. The Norwegian 
reimbursement system prior to 1997 – which implied that hospitals received a global 
budget by the beginning of each year – could be characterised as a prospective 
payment system, and thus gave incentives to cream skimming. However, the 
reimbursement system was combined with strong prioritising signals, both from 
central government and from county politicians, which were compatible with basic 
medical ethics: patient severity should be the main prioritising rule. It is generally 
believed that this rule was followed. Yet, as a result of relatively low growth in 
hospital budgets during the first part of the 1990s waiting lists and waiting time for 
elective treatment was high. The implementation of ABF from 1 July 1997 implied 
that a proportion of the block grant from central government was replaced by a 
matching grant depending upon the number and composition of hospital treatments 
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measured by the DRG system. Initially, 30 per cent of the grant was related to the 
number of DRG equivalents. The ABF share was gradually increased to 60 per cent of 
the total budget in 2003, reduced to 40 per cent in 2004 and yet again increased to 60 
per cent in 2005. The introduction of ABF increased production and efficiency (Biørn 
et al., 2003) and reduced waiting lists and waiting time. But has it also lead to cream 
skimming? Will a shift from a low-powered to a higher-powered prospective payment 
system influence priorities? A survey conducted in 1999 on the consequences of the 
ABF system indicates that this may be the case. The results show that 10 per cent of 
the chief surgeons in somatic hospitals had experienced pressure or instructions from 
the hospital management to give preference to profitable patients (Halvorsen, 1999). 
Also, in 10 per cent of the outpatient departments the respondents held the opinion 
that the choice as to whether patient treatment were to take place via hospitalisation, 
day treatment or in outpatient departments was guided by revenue generation rather 
than medical evaluations. Moreover, 25 per cent of the chief surgeons considered 
operations and treatment to be de-prioritised due to dependency of outpatient income.  
The second major reform implied that the central state from 1 January 2002 took 
over ownership and responsibility of hospitals from the county governments, 
organized the hospitals as trusts within five regional health authorities and 
implemented private sector accounting systems (Hagen & Kaarbøe 2006).  Again, one 
can hypothesize increased cream skimming, as trusts are believed to be more revenue-
oriented than governmental bodies. Even if central government has emphasised that 
prioritisations should be grounded in medical ethics rather than on the basis of 
economic evaluations, there has been a growing concern – indicated for instance in 
several articles in the Journal of the Norwegian Medical Association (e.g. Haug, 
2001; Pettersen, 2001; Øgar, 2001) – that the contrary would be the case. A survey 
conducted in 2006 furthermore demonstrates that 60 percent of hospital physicians 
view the new organizational model as giving incentives for prioritizing profitable 
patients. One in three physicians reports that a businesslike way of making priorities – 
meaning that patients are prioritized according to the net revenues they generate – is 
emphasized in their department (Aasland et al., 2006).  
Thus, we can state our two main hypotheses as such:  
1) Hospitals partly reimbursed by DRG-based activity based financing will with a 
probability select low severity patients over high severity patients (low risk over 
high risk patients) within the actual DRG. 
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2) Turning the hospitals into trusts will increase the probability with which the 
hospitals select low severity patients over high severity patients within the actual 
DRG. 
3. Operationalization of main variables 
We test our hypothesis by investigating the relationship between waiting time for 
treatment and severity for elective patients. Our dependent variable, waiting time for 
treatment (WT), is defined as the number of calendar days from the patient is referred 
from the primary physician or private specialist to the hospital treatment starts. If our 
hypotheses are confirmed, waiting time should be lower for low severity than for high 
severity patients. 
The essential explanatory variable, patient severity, is operationalized as the 
patient’s length of stay (LOS) in the hospital. As already indicated, severity is 
hypothesised to affect waiting time positively. There are two underlying assumptions 
here. First, we assume that LOS within each DRG is a proxy for severity. This is 
documented in several studies for inpatients (e.g. van den Pool et al 2006) and now 
also for procedures that can be performed both in inpatient and outpatient departments 
(e.g. Latham et al 2006). Second, we assume that that hospitals in most cases hold 
relatively detailed information about a patient’s condition before the surgery takes 
place, obtained either through medical deliberations from the patient’s primary 
physician, through outpatient consultations at the hospital, or both. Norway makes for 
a particular case here, since the waiting time regulations guarantee that a hospital 
specialist within a maximum of thirty days after referral and before surgery will 
formally assess all patients. When organising the waiting list, the hospital will 
therefore have a pretty good ex ante estimate on most patients’ LOS, and thereby on 
the resources that can be expected to be related to each case. Consequently, and 
although there will be exceptions, LOS registered ex post can be used as proxy for ex 
ante evaluations of severity. Exceptions will be related to for instance post operational 
infections and other complications during the hospital stay. Given the ABF-reform 
described above, we hypothesize that the hospitals will have an incentive to select the 
patients that can be assumed to have the shortest LOS; i.e. the patients demanding the 
least resources for a given  economic refund.  
We test our propositions on data from day surgery since the ABF system 
offers the same economic reimbursement for day surgical patients irrespective of their 
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length of stay in the hospital. The data set consists of more than 1.2 millions patients 
receiving day surgery during the period 1999-2005. Figure 1 shows the increase in 
day surgical activity during the period. 
 
- Figure 1 - 
  
A first impression of the relationship between patient severity and waiting time for 
elective day surgery can be obtained by comparing the waiting time for short stays 
(LOS = 0.5 day) and long stays (LOS ≥ 1 day), respectively (figure 2). The figure 
obviously lends little support to a hypothesis that more severe patients waited longer 
than less severe patients. Even though waiting time for short stays dropped during the 
period, the waiting time decreased more than the double for long stays, with 38 days 
for the former type of patients and 87 days for the latter. Notice in particular the 
significant drop in short-stay waiting time from 2002 – the year of the hospital reform 
– to 2005, during which waiting time was reduced by 29 days.  
 
- Figure 2 - 
 
Treating all day-surgical activity as one naturally implies a vast over-simplification. 
Given that day surgery in 2005 comprised 151 different DRGs, involving a large 
number of various procedures, a more suitable approach is instead to focus on the 
specific day-surgical DRGs. Figure 3 therefore presents the actual share of same-day 
treatments performed within the day-surgical DRGs that had a patient volume of at 
least 2 per cent of all day surgery during the 1999-2005-period. The table serves as a 
good illustration of why day surgery deserves special attention in the context of 
patient selection: within several of the day-surgical DRGs there is a surprisingly low 
share of patients that are actually treated by same-day treatment, while other DRGs 
have an almost 100 per cent same-day treatment share. In fact, the percentage same-
day treatment is below 70 per cent for one third of the DRGs presented in figure 3, 
and for DRGs 60, 112 and 359 the share of same-day treatment is even below 50 per 
cent. At the other end of the scale we find DRGs 6, 39, 40 and 381, with more than 90 
per cent same-day treatments (for a description of the DRGs, see table 2). The large 
variation between the DRGs in terms of the actual use of same-day treatment is 
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naturally related to the procedures’ level of complexity and patients’ convalescence 
period.  
 
- Figure 3 - 
 
The potential for patient selection is naturally higher the larger and more 
heterogeneous the patient group. Hence, for the DRGs with near 100 per cent same-
day treatment, there exits little room for making this kind of prioritisations between 
patients based on assumed LOS, given that almost all patients are treated the same 
day. However, since it is difficult to decide exactly where to set the limit for which 
DRGs should be investigated, and in order to obtain as complete a picture as possible, 
we choose to include all DRGs in our analysis.  
4. Empirical model 
Although patient severity described by LOS is the variable of main interest in our 
study, a number of additional variables can naturally be expected to influence waiting 
time (WTi) for patient i, and consequently need to be controlled for in the analysis. 
Our basic empirical model captures effects of patient-specific, hospital-specific and 
time-specific variables within each DRG, and can be written: 
 
Ln(WTi) = β0 + β1Ln(LOSi) + β2Ln(Agei) + β3Genderi + β4D + vi                             (1) 
 
Age is patient i’s age measured in intervals of five years, and gender is a dummy-
variable for which the value of 1 is assigned to male patients, otherwise 0. D is a 
vector of dummies representing institutional and time-specific variables specified in 
alternative ways, while v is the error term. The structure of the error term is affected 
by the specifications of D, which we now turn to. First, and common to all empirical 
specifications, we estimate the impact of the 2002 hospital reform by a dummy 
variable, REFORM, that takes the value of 0 in the period from 1999 to 2001 and the 
value of 1 in the period from 2002 to 2005, and an interaction term between REFORM 
and LOS (LOS x REFORM). In one of our estimated models we additionally include 
hospital-specific (H) and year-specific dummy variables (Y). Equation (2a) expresses 
this alternative specification for the dummy variables in (1): 
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D = β5REFORM +β6(LOS x REFORMi) + β7H + β8Y                                             (2a) 
 
β1 gives us the effect of patient severity on waiting time under the financial regime of 
ABF (before the 2002 hospital reform), while (β1+β6) gives us the estimated effects of 
patient severity on waiting time after the hospital reform. If turning hospitals into 
trusts increases cream skimming, the interaction term should take positive estimates 
(β6 >1).  The time trend in waiting time will be captured by REFORM and the time-
specific variables, Y. As figure 2 indicates, there has been a strong reduction in 
waiting time during the 7-year-period studied. The reduction in waiting time for 
elective treatments started in 2000 mainly as the result of the introduction of ABF in 
1997 and a general increase in expenses to hospital care from the same moment in 
time. After the responsibility for providing specialized health services was transferred 
to central government in 2002, there has been a further reduction in average waiting 
time of more than 20 per cent. The hospital-specific variables (H), included for both 
public and private hospitals, will work as ‘fixed effects’. The fixed effects will 
capture both observed and unobserved time-constant variables. In addition, by 
controlling for fixed effects we are able to study the within effects of the time varying 
variables, for example LOS. The estimates of LOS in the fixed effects-models tell us 
how much WT changes as LOS changes, within the specific hospitals (and for the 
specific DRG).  
Not all institutional variables are time constant variables. Some variables that 
may affect WT change both between institutions and over time. The hospitals’ budget 
is one such variable. Another is a non-observed variable that describes the 
introduction of separate day-surgical units during the period analysed. Obviously, an 
increase in day surgical units may stimulate treatments of less severe cases. To 
account for unobserved variables that change within hospitals and across time we 
include an interaction term between Y and H.  Equation (2b) represents and alternative 
specification of the dummy variables in (1) that capture the challenges from observed 
and unobserved variables that are both varying between and within institutions: 
 
D = β5Reform + β6LOSi x Reform + β7Y + β9Y x H                                                (2b) 
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We report results from equation 1, specification 2a, in the tables, and comment upon 
the results from specification 2b in the text. Descriptive statistics for the variables are 
presented in table 1. 
5. Empirical results 
The analysis employs patient-data for the period from 1999 to 2005, and includes only 
day-surgical DRGs that represent a patient volume of at least 2 per cent of all day-
surgical stays during the period, and by this criterion we are left with 16 DRGs 
available for analysis, each DRG including between 22 785 and 154 293 patients. The 
basic model (equation 2a) is estimated via OLS regression, and the results are 
reported in table 2.  
 
- Table 2 - 
 
Starting with the variables of main interest, the empirical results lend support to our 
first hypothesis, as we observe a positive relationship between severity – described by 
LOS – and waiting time for 10 of the 16 DRGs analysed. In particular, for the light 
orthopaedic procedures (DRG 222: operations on knee, DRG 224: operations on 
shoulder, elbow and forearm, DRG 225: foot procedures, DRG 229: hand and wrist 
procedures and DRG 232: arthroscopy) there is a marked difference in waiting time. 
We also find the same pattern for lens procedures (DRG 39), extra ocular procedures 
(DRG 40), tonsillectomy (DRG 60), percutaneous cardiovascular procedures (DRG 
112), and vein ligation and stripping (DRG 119). The estimates for the LOS-variable  
is expressed as elasticises and should be interpreted as the percentage increase in 
waiting time for one percentage increase in LOS. The tendency of patient selection 
due to severity is most pronounced for percutaneous cardiovascular procedures and 
knee operations, for which a 1 per cent increase in LOS increases waiting time with 
0.81 for the former and 0.24 per cent for the latter. In practical terms, the effects 
amount to average increases in waiting time of 72 and 33 days, respectively. 
Note however that the estimates of LOS on waiting time vary considerably 
between the DRGs; from 0.81 to 0.06 per cent. In the cases of the weakest effects 
associated with LOS one may therefore question the practical impact in terms of 
actual waiting time, but that would be jumping to conclusions. Consider for instance 
the LOS-estimate of .06 per cent obtained for DRG 225 (foot procedures): given that 
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the average waiting time is over 212 days for such treatment, a 1 per cent increase in 
LOS would still imply that a patient on average stand to wait almost two weeks longer 
for treatment (when the other independent variables are held constant) – which could 
be quite much in cases of painful illnesses.  
However, the picture is not quite clear-cut, as the results also indicate the 
opposite relationship for LOS and waiting time – i.e. prioritisation according to 
severity – for 3 of the 16 DRGs analysed: DRGs 36 (retinal procedures), 270 (other 
skin, subcut tissue and breast procedures), and 359 (uterine and adnexa procedures).  
While we consider our first hypothesis – that hospitals reimbursed by DRG-
based ABF-systems will select low severity patients over high severity patients within 
the actual DRG – as partly confirmed, our second hypothesis receives little support at 
all. The interaction variable (LOS x REFORM) indicates whether the hospitals after 
the trust reform select patients on different criteria than before the reform within the 
actual DRG. It takes negative values for 5 and non-significant estimates for 9 of the 
16 DRGs. This indicates that the problem of cream skimming is reduced after the 
reform. Only for 2 of the DRGs (DRG 162: inguinal and femoral hernia procedures 
and DRG 359: uterine and adnexa procedures) do we observe a positive relationship 
for the interaction variable, indicating increased cream skimming in this period.  
Age does not seem to be systematically related to waiting time. It is however 
worth bringing up that the waiting time for DRG 112 (percutaneous cardiovascular 
procedures) is significantly lower for persons with high age than for those who are 
younger. The empirical results furthermore uncover relatively strong gender 
differences in waiting time, and, with a few exceptions, in favour of male patients: 
men waited shorter than women for treatment in as many as 9 of the DRGs analysed. 
The differences are most pronounced for extra ocular procedures (DRG 40) and foot 
procedures (DRG 225). The advantages enjoyed by male patients are above 0.10 per 
cent only in 3 of the 9 DRGs. The opposite relationship only appears in 2 cases: male 
patients waited longer than female patients for DRG 224 (shoulder, elbow or forearm 
procedures) and DRG 229 (hand or wrist procedures). 
The effects of the variable that describes the 2002 hospital reform and the 
year-specific dummy-variables reflect the strong reductions in waiting time during the 
period of analysis. As can be observed, in particular lighter orthopaedic procedures 
have had a strong decrease in waiting time from 1999 to 2005. 
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Finally, the alternative specification of the dummy variables – the inclusion of 
a year-specific and hospital-specific interaction term in addition to the year-wise 
dummy-variables (equation 2b) – only marginally alters the results reported in table 2 
(the results are not reported here). This model increases the explanatory power of the 
model for all DRGs analysed, which is naturally to be expected. The estimates for the 
variable of main interest, LOS, appear robust, as we generally obtain estimates very 
close to those returned from the basic model (equation 2a). In the cases for which 
LOS exerts the strongest positive effect on waiting time – DRGs 112 and 222 – the 
estimated effect are reduced somewhat for the former procedure, from 0.78 to 0.61 
per cent, and increased marginally, from 0.22 to 0.24 per cent, for the latter. As 
regards the interaction term (LOS x REFORM), it is worth noticing that the alternative 
specification returns a significant positive estimate for DRG 39, a significant negative 
estimate for DRG 60, while the significant positive estimate obtained for DRG 162 in 
the basic model becomes insignificant. Otherwise, the results basically remain the 
same.  
  
6. Conclusions 
In the setting of this paper, cream skimming is the kind of patient selection that occurs 
when patients that demand little resources for a given economic refund (low risks) are 
prioritized over patients that demand more resources for the same refund (high risks). 
We have investigated whether cream skimming takes place within day surgery after 
the introduction of ABF in Norway in 1997, and if the problem has increased after the 
public hospitals was turned into trusts from 2002.  
Our first hypothesis, that hospitals reimbursed by DRG-based ABF-systems 
select low severity patients over high severity patients within the actual DRG, is 
confirmed. Our empirical investigation signifies that some form of patient selection 
occurs within several of the largest DRGs. Yet, our results should be interpreted with 
some caution. First of all, the practical impact of patient severity on waiting time is 
marginal for some of the DRGs studied. It must therefore be emphasised that the 
tendency of patient selection applies first and foremost to the light orthopaedic 
procedures: it is for these procedures that the positive LOS-effects are most 
pronounced, with the waiting time disadvantages exceeding a week for each extra day 
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LOS. Secondly, it is also important to bear in mind that our analyses concentrate on 
the ‘easiest’ of the ‘easy’ patients. In other words, these are patients that are better 
suited to wait than patients with more severe illnesses.  
Our second hypothesis was that the problem of cream skimming would 
increase after turning the Norwegian hospitals into trusts in 2002. This hypothesis 
failed to receive any support. Although there has been a huge increase in the treatment 
of patients with lighter diagnosis in the period after the 2002 reform (Martinussen, 
2005), the problem of cream skimming within the actual diagnosis is stable or even 
reduced for many of the DRGs in this period. A possible explanation of this is 
stronger prioritizing signals from the Ministry of Health (MOH). It can be argued that 
the fear of cream skimming has led the MOH to be more active than before, and that 
strong prioritizing signals have been formulated and included both in political 
speeches and in the annual planning documents from the MOH to the regional health 
authorities.  
An important point related to cream skimming noted by Pauly (1984), is that 
cream skimming is the result of regulation and not of competition. If insurers, or in 
our setting the providers, were free to set their premiums in a competitive market, the 
result would be premium differentiation rather than cream skimming. The problem is 
that premium differentiation in a free market is bound to imply that for instance an 
80-year old person would have to pay a much higher premium than a 20-year old, and 
that a chronically sick person would have to pay many times the premium of a 
chronically well person of the same age. Risk-adjusted per capita payments (or 
vouchers) can therefore be seen as “a form of regulation that attempts to simulate the 
premium structure in a competitive health insurance market without having the 
adverse effect of (extreme) premium differentiation” (Pauly, 1984: 24). Hence, cream 
skimming is likely to occur when the system of risk-adjusted payments is not 
sufficiently sophisticated. In this analysis the risk-adjusted payment is not very 
sophisticated since hospitals receive the same price irrespective of the patient is 
treated same day or as an inpatient. The study indicate that this can lead to cream 
skimming, but also that the problem of cream skimming can be reduced not only by 
premium differentiation but also by political signalling. 
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Figures  
 
Figure 1. Per cent day surgery of all elective surgery and all surgery, Norway, 1999-
2005.  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Per cent day surgery
of all elective surgery
Per cent day surgery
of all surgery
 
 
Figure 2. Average waiting time and length of stay for day-surgical DRGs (elective 
stays), Norway, 1999-2005. 
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Figure 3. Per cent same-day treatment within specific day-surgical DRGs, Norway, 
1999-2005. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the variables in the analysis. Minimum and 
maximum values, mean and standard deviation. 
 Min. value Max. value Mean Std. deviation 
1999 (Valid N=124 872):     
LOS .50 208.00 1.88 3.05 
Age  1.00 18.00 10.16 4.89 
Male .00 1.00 .41 .49 
Reform .00 .00 .00 .00 
LOS*Reform .00 .00 .00 .00 
Waiting time 1.00 999.00 175.75 187.58 
2000 (Valid N = 171 387):     
LOS .50 202.00 1.65 2.66 
Age  1.00 18.00 10.12 4.84 
Male .00 1.00 .40 .49 
Reform .00 .00 .00 .00 
LOS*Reform .00 .00 .00 .00 
Waiting time 1.00 999.00 171.66 187.95 
2001 (Valid N = 194 212):     
LOS .50 196.00 1.70 2.86 
Age  1.00 18.00 10.20 4.70 
Male .00 1.00 .40 .49 
Reform .00 .00 .00 .00 
LOS*Reform .00 .00 .00 .00 
Waiting time 1.00 999.00 167.76 190.21 
2002 (Valid N = 196 192):     
LOS .50 109.00 1.62 2.69 
Age  1.00 18.00 10.27 4.63 
Male .00 1.00 .41 .49 
Reform 1.00 1.00 1.00 .00 
LOS*Reform .00 109.00 1.29 2.83 
Waiting time 1.00 999.00 161.91 181.60 
2003 (Valid N = 225 910):     
LOS .50 213.00 1.75 3.19 
Age  1.00 18.00 10.51 4.58 
Male .00 1.00 .42 .49 
Reform 1.00 1.00 1.00 .00 
LOS*Reform .00 213.00 1.42 3.32 
Waiting time 1.00 999.00 146.88 169.00 
2004 (Valid N = 167 015):     
LOS .50 192.00 1.73 3.27 
Age  1.00 18.00 10.55 4.62 
Male .00 1.00 .42 .49 
Reform 1.00 1.00 1.00 .00 
LOS*Reform .00 192.00 1.40 3.40 
Waiting time 1.00 999.00 137.56 160.71 
2005 (Valid N = 189 234):     
LOS .50 178.00 1.70 3.23 
Age 1.00 18.00 10.53 4.61 
Male .00 1.00 .43 .49 
Reform 1.00 1.00 1.00 .00 
LOS*Reform .00 178.00 1.37 3.36 
Waiting time 1.00 999.00 138.91 162.04 
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Table 2. Determinants of waiting time for elective day surgery, Norway, 1999-2005. Estimates obtained from OLS regression. Unstandardised estimates with standardised t-values in parenthesis.  
 DRG 
6 
DRG  
36 
DRG  
39 
DRG  
40 
DRG  
60 
DRG 
112 
DRG 
119 
DRG 
162 
DRG 
222 
DRG 
224 
DRG 
225 
DRG 
229 
DRG 
232 
DRG 
270 
DRG 
359 
DRG 
381 
LOS 
(log) 
.033 
(1.07) 
-.208** 
(14.06) 
.080** 
(9.48) 
.079** 
(4.55) 
.065** 
(7.18) 
.782** 
(31.70) 
.069** 
(5.34) 
-.016 
(1.41) 
.243** 
(26.71) 
.129** 
(10.58) 
.058** 
(5.47) 
.117** 
(9.33) 
.166** 
(14.72) 
-.136** 
(9.77) 
-.036** 
(4.79) 
-.009 
(.17) 
Age 
(log) 
-.097** 
(4.41) 
-.096** 
(3.89) 
.119** 
(9.25) 
.012 
(.73) 
.072** 
(6.78) 
-.593** 
(20.98) 
-.032 
(1.66) 
.099** 
(5.10) 
.056** 
(4.55) 
-.040 
(1.77) 
-.085** 
(5.44) 
.201** 
(15.66) 
.135** 
(8.88) 
-.384** 
(36.38) 
-.107** 
(4.69) 
-.075** 
(5.27) 
Gender .017 
(1.30) 
.008 
(.47) 
-.027** 
(5.63) 
-.178** 
(16.10) 
.010 
(1.07) 
-.069** 
(3.46) 
-.081** 
(7.07) 
-.126** 
(6.17) 
-.053** 
(5.83) 
.032* 
(2.22) 
-.148** 
(9.86) 
.097** 
(7.44) 
-.056** 
(4.86) 
-.074** 
(5.54) 
- - 
Reform -.116** 
(4.07) 
-.056 
(1.50) 
-.235** 
(21.64) 
.073** 
(2.94) 
-.028 
(1.32) 
-.250** 
(5.14) 
.036 
(1.70) 
-.227** 
(9.06) 
-.108** 
(3.08) 
-.083* 
(2.41) 
-.054* 
(2.24) 
-.103** 
(3.76) 
.041 
(1.53) 
-.009 
(.27) 
-.131** 
(4.90) 
-.096** 
(6.77) 
Year 
2000 
-.108** 
(4.06) 
.064 
(1.71) 
.030** 
(3.345 
.053* 
(2.22) 
-.043* 
(2.55) 
-.353** 
(7.81) 
-.003 
(.13) 
-.016 
(.69) 
.011 
(.33) 
-.136** 
(4.15) 
-.072** 
(3.04) 
-.069** 
(2.63) 
-.103** 
(6.17) 
-.034 
(.99) 
.002 
(.08) 
-.017 
(1.22) 
Year 
2001 
-.158** 
(6.13) 
-.086* 
(2.32) 
-.178** 
(19.48) 
.071** 
(3.04) 
.018 
(1.06) 
-.306** 
(7.23) 
.001 
(.065) 
-.077** 
(3.51) 
.025 
(.75) 
-.144** 
(4.53) 
-.060** 
(2.62) 
-.078** 
(3.03) 
-.083** 
(5.02) 
.062 
(1.86) 
-.016 
(.75) 
-.046** 
(3.27) 
Year 
2003 
-.155** 
(7.53) 
.118** 
(4.21) 
-.116** 
(13.99) 
-.232** 
(12.45) 
-.103** 
(5.94) 
.067* 
(2.26) 
-.249** 
(15.50) 
-.171** 
(8.51) 
-.179** 
(13.84) 
-.079** 
(3.22) 
-.138** 
(7.00) 
-.148** 
(6.54) 
-.196** 
(6.73) 
-.001 
(.03) 
-.062** 
(3.29) 
.012 
(1.04) 
Year 
2004 
-.125** 
(5.45) 
.021 
(.66) 
-.219** 
(24.13) 
-.327** 
(16.06) 
-.215** 
(10.95) 
-.137** 
(4.09) 
-.351** 
(18.49) 
-.364** 
(16.00) 
-.231** 
(16.13) 
-.176** 
(6.59) 
-.218** 
(9.64) 
-.236** 
(9.41) 
-.215** 
(6.56) 
.063 
(2.67) 
-.114** 
(5.46) 
-.064** 
(4.94) 
Year 
2005 
-.276** 
(12.96) 
.113** 
(3.78) 
-.572** 
(64.27) 
-.176** 
(9.41) 
-.089** 
(4.77) 
-.340** 
(10.53) 
-.346** 
(19.39) 
-.375** 
(16.94) 
-.274** 
(19.63) 
-.140** 
(5.47) 
-.277** 
(13.28) 
-.283** 
(11.87) 
-.319** 
(9.60) 
.085 
(3.68) 
-.117** 
(5.64) 
-.078** 
(5.81) 
LOS* 
Reform 
.033 
(1.44) 
.006 
(1.01) 
.013 
(1.45) 
-.069** 
(5.57) 
-.014 
(1.78) 
-.104** 
(9.29) 
-.063** 
(5.39) 
.024* 
(2.48) 
.002 
(.37) 
-.029** 
(4.17) 
-.016** 
(2.50) 
.010 
(1.27) 
-.012 
(.83) 
.001 
(.22) 
.011** 
(2.81) 
.022 
(.86) 
Intercept 4.290** 
(65.96) 
5.023** 
(67.35) 
4.220** 
(111.80) 
5.281 
(102.26) 
3.768** 
(180.48) 
5.851** 
(69.05) 
5.046** 
(96.33) 
4.377** 
(75.74) 
4.275** 
(100.57) 
4.748** 
(77.50) 
5.125** 
(117.46) 
4.036** 
(95.42) 
4.109** 
(103.74) 
5.133** 
(112.38) 
4.371** 
(77.25) 
2.397** 
(51.72) 
Adj. R2 .12 .06 .13 .05 .14 .21 .14 .15 .17 .11 .09 .11 .09 .12 .06 .07 
N 29 178 26 840 154 293 44 622 35 758 24 784 34 096 27 885 57 480 22 785 28 406 31 468 37 076 36 133 39 887 71 728 
** = p < .01, * = p < .05 
 
 
 
 
DRG 6: carpal tunnel release 
DRG 36: retinal procedures y 
DRG 39: lens procedures with or without vitrectomy  
DRG 40: extra ocular proc except orbit age > 17 
DRG 60: tonsillectomy &/or adenoidectomy only, age 0-17 
DRG 112: percutaneous cardiovascular procedures 
DRG 119: vein ligation & stripping 
DRG 162: inguinal & femoral hernia procedures age > 17 w/o cc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DRG 222: operation on knee excl prosthesis op w/o cc 
DRG 224: shoulder, elbow or forearm proc, exc major joint proc 
DRG 225: foot procedures 
DRG 229: hand or wrist proc, exc major jointporc, w/o cc 
DRG 232: arthroscopy  
DRG 270: other skin, sub cut tiss & breast proc w/o cc 
DRG 359: uterine & adnexa proc for non-malignancy w/o cc 
DRG 381: abortion w d&c, aspiration curettage or hysterectomy  
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Appendix: Variable definitions 
 
Data have been provided by the Norwegian Patient Register (NPR). NPR is not in any 
way responsible for how the data are used in this article. 
 
Waiting time (Ln): The number of days from the patient is referred to hospital 
treatment until admission to a hospital takes place, logarithmic form. 
 
Length of stay (Ln): The patient’s discharge date minus hospitalisation date, 
logarithmic form. 
 
Age (Ln): The patient’s age on logarithmic form, based on the following age cuts: 
1: 0-4 years 
2: 5-9 years 
3: 10-14 years 
4: 15-19 years 
5: 20-20 years 
6: 25-29 years 
7: 30-34 years 
8: 35-39 years 
9: 40-44 years 
10: 45-49 years 
11: 50-54 years 
12: 55-59 years 
13: 60-64 years 
14: 65-69 years 
15: 70-74 years 
16: 75-80 years 
17: 80-84 years 
18: 80+ years 
 
Gender: Dummy-variable for which the value of 1 is assigned to male patients. 
 
Year 2000: Dummy-variable for which the value of 1 is assigned to hospital stays in 
2000.   
 
Year 2001: Dummy-variable for which the value of 1 is assigned to hospital stays in 
2001. 
 
Year 2002: Dummy-variable for which the value of 1 is assigned to hospital stays in 
2002. 
 
Year 2003: Dummy-variable for which the value of 1 is assigned to hospital stays in 
2003. 
 
Year 2004: Dummy-variable for which the value of 1 is assigned to hospital stays in 
2004. 
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Year 2005: Dummy-variable for which the value of 1 is assigned to patients that were 
treated in 2004. 
 
Reform: Dummy-variable for which the value f 1 is assigned to hospital stays during 
the years after the hospital reform, i.e. 2002-2005. 
 
LOS x Reform: Interaction term for length of stay and reform. 
 
Hospital-specific dummies: Dummy-variables for which the value of 1 is assigned to 
hospital stays in the respective health enterprise (the estimates for these dummy-
variables are not reported in the tables). 
 
